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Abstract
I analyze dynamic Mirrlees taxation with preferences that are non-separable between con-
sumption, leisure and type, which determines both ability and consumption needs. I show how
to account for non-separable preferences through a simple change in probability measures. I ge-
neralize the existing Inverse Euler Equation and optimal static labor tax formulae and provide
a unified intuition based on a set of perturbations around the optimal allocations that preserve
expected utility and incentive compatibility. Non-separability in preferences gives rise to a new
tradeoff between current and future redistribution that is internalized by the planner’s solution
but not by private savings decisions. This leads to a novel rationale to subsidize (tax) savings
and make labor taxes more (less) persistent, when more productive agents also have higher
(lower) consumption needs.
1 Introduction
How should optimal taxes be structured to balance redistribution motives and efficiency distorti-
ons? Starting with the seminal work of Mirrlees (1971), the existing literature on optimal income
taxes captures the efficiency-redistribution tradeoff through a basic asymmetric information friction:
workers have private information about their ability or inclination to work.1 Dynamic life cycle
economies augment the tax design problem by a dynamic insurance motive through stochastic
evolution of individual types (i.e. abilities or preferences) and aggregate savings.
∗I thank Fabrice Collard, Tuuli Vanhapelto and Nicolas Werquin for useful discussions and seminar participants at Toulouse
School of Economics for comments. Funding from the French National Research Agency (ANR) under grant ANR-17-EURE-
0010 (Investissements d’Avenir) is gratefully acknowledged.
1see Mirrlees (1971), Diamond (1998), Saez (2001), among many others.
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Existing results on dynamic optimal tax design leverage an assumption that preferences are
separable, and in particular that the marginal utility of consumption is independent of leisure or
ability types, into a sharp characterization of optimal labor and savings distortions.2 Optimal
savings distortions are characterized by the Inverse Euler Equation, which captures the idea that
wealth accumulation has adverse effects on future incentives to work (see e.g. Diamond and Mirrlees,
1978, and Rogerson, 1985, and Golosov, Kocherlakota and Tsyvinski, 2003). In parallel, Farhi and
Werning (2013) and Golosov, Troshkin and Tsyvinski (2016) have characterized optimal labor
wedges emphasizing smoothing and backloading of tax distortions.
The separability assumption plays a key role in limiting the interaction between static redistri-
bution and dynamic savings margins, which greatly facilitates the characterization of each of the
two margins separately. At the same time it imposes strong restrictions on substitution between
home production and market work, across periods or wealth effects on labor supply, which in turn
limit the scope of applicability for many questions of applied interest involving life-cycle savings,
home production, taxation of couples, or insurance against important life cycle risks. Aguiar and
Hurst (2005, 2007) document patterns of substitution between market and non-market work and
consumption in both the time series and cross section which directly contradict this hypothesis.3
I characterize optimal labor and savings wedges in a dynamic Mirrleesian economy with arbitrary
non-separability in preferences between consumption, types and leisure.4 I show three main results:
First, I identify a new rationale for savings taxes or subsidies based on the effect of savings
on current redistribution. This rationale is conceptually distinct from the wealth effect of savings
on future incentives that was captured by the original Inverse Euler Equation, and it disappears
when preferences are separable. Furthermore, when it is optimal to subsidize savings, the optimal
allocation features mean-reverting social mobility and overturns the immiseration property that
often characterizes optimal social mobility in dynamic private information economies.5
2see e.g. Kocherlakota, Golosov and Tsyvinski (2003), Kocherlakota (2005), Albanesi and Sleet (2006), Golosov
and Tsyvinski (2006), Farhi and Werning (2013), Golosov, Troshkin, and Tsyvinski (2016), or Stantcheva (2018) for
important contributions and Stantcheva (2020) for a recent review of the literature.
3see also Aguiar, Hurst and Karabarbounis (2012) for a review and further discussion of consumption patterns
and intra- and inter-temporal substitution between time use and consumption goods at the micro level. Benhabib,
Rogerson and Wright (1991) have shown how allowing for substitution between home and market production improves
upon some key predictions of standard real business cycle models.
4Grochulski and Kocherlakota (2010), Köhne and Kuhn (2015) and Köhne (2018) extend the dynamic Mirrlees
model to allow for non-time separable preferences through the introduction of habits or durable consumption goods,
but they retain the separability of consumption and effort.
5See for example Thomas and Worrall (1990), or Atkeson and Lucas (1992).
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Savings affect current information rents and redistribution both directly and indirectly because
a change in future redistribution also feeds back into current incentives. These two effects go
in opposite directions but the direct effect dominates unless types are highly persistent, and in
expectation, the effect of savings on current redistribution always dominates the wealth effect of
savings on future incentives. If consumption needs or marginal utilities are increasing with the
worker’s ability type, savings reduce current information rents and facilitate current redistribution:
this makes it optimal to subsidize savings. When instead low-ability types have higher consumption
needs, it becomes optimal to tax savings. The magnitude of this savings wedge is increasing in the
optimal concurrent labor tax and decreasing in the persistence of types.
Second, I provide a new characterization of optimal labor wedges based on an arbitrage between
redistribution of consumption and redistribution of leisure. This arbitrage highlights that the
optimal allocation doesn’t just trade off between incentives and redistribution, but also between
the channels through which redistribution takes place: is it more efficient to tax top income earners
by asking them to work harder, or by asking them to consume less?
The optimal allocation equalizes the marginal cost of redistribution to the marginal benefit of
redistribution through consumption and to the marginal benefit of redistribution through leisure,
for each type, i.e. at the optimum, the planner is indifferent between increasing the work load,
or reducing the consumption, of the most productive types. This simple observation leads to a
natural complement of existing formulae for optimal income taxes from the static Mirrlees model
(e.g. Diamond 1998, Saez, 2001) or the dynamic tax formula in Golosov, Troshkin and Tsyvinski
(2016), which applies in both static and dynamic economies, and is easy to link to sufficient statistics
from the distribution of earnings and consumption.
The marginal cost of redistribution is given by the ratio of the marginal efficiency loss from
the labor distortion to the reduction in marginal information rents for a given type. The marginal
benefits of redistribution consist of a static component and a dynamic component. The static
component is determined by perturbations that transfer consumption or leisure from higher to
lower types while preserving expected utility and incentive compatibility. The additional dynamic
benefit of tax distortions arises because a commitment to future labor taxes and redistribution also
reduces current information rents, thus facilitating current redistribution. The optimal labor wedge
arbitrages distortions over time, while internalizing that future labor distortions generate an extra
benefit from raising future redistribution. As in Farhi and Werning (2013), the optimal labor taxes
are persistent and backloaded over time or with age.
Third, when preferences are non-separable, labor tax-smoothing interacts with the optimal
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savings wedge, since the latter determines the planner’s discount rate between current and future
costs and benefits fo redistribution. Taxing or subsidizing savings to increase current redistribution
goes hand in hand with increasing or reducing the persistence of labor tax distortions. In addition,
the feedback from future to current incentives and redistribution also affects optimal persistence of
labor taxes directly.
All my results derive from the following key technical insight: Non-separability in preferences
enters the characterization of optimal allocations through a change in the probability measure
of types, or Radon-Nikodym derivative, that can be interpreted as an “incentive adjustment”
to Pareto weights that is required to respect incentive compatibility. If a local perturbation of
consumption allocations relaxes (tightens) incentive compatibility constraints for higher types, then
the perturbation increases (reduces) the scope for further redistribution. The change in probability
measures captures this through a first-order shift of probability weights towards lower (higher)
types. This effect disappears with separable preferences because local perturbations of consumption
impact incentive constraints only locally, so the original and incentive-adjusted Pareto weights are
the same. A similar change in probabilities results from perturbations to leisure, but the latter
always shifts weights towards lower ability types. The change in probability measure appears
in some existing characterizations of the optimal labor wedge, but doesn’t appear to have been
interpreted as such.6
This characterization of optimal allocations in turn allows me to interpret optimal labor and
savings wedges through elementary perturbations that capture the marginal costs and benefits
of redistribution, or the private and social marginal returns to savings, thus providing a unified
intuition and generalization of many existing results to arbitrary preferences: Optimal savings
wedges are characterized by a generalized Inverse Euler Equation which incorporates the wealth
effect of savings on future incentives through the change in probabilities, and adds a static savings
wedge to account for the effect of savings on current period incentives. Optimal labor wedges
are captured by a dual representation of the costs and benefits of redistribution through either
consumption and leisure, which are each governed by their respective change in probabilities. Their
combination highlights a novel two-way interaction that arises from concerns for redistribution that
are internalized by the planner’s solution but not by private decisions. The magnitude of the optimal
savings wedge is linked to the magnitude of current labor wedges since the latter is used to “price”
current redistribution, and the persistence of labor wedges is linked to the sign and level of the
6See, e.g. Hellwig (2007) or for the static Mirrlees model with non-separable preferences, or Golosov, Troshkin
and Tsyvinski (2016) for a similar characterization in the dynamic model with non-separable preferences.
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savings wedge since the latter determines the optimal tradeoff between current and future resources
and efficiency distortions.
From an applied perspective, these results substantially expand the applicability of optimal tax-
ation results. Whenever households tradeoff between market and non-market work or consumption,
or when labor supply decisions coordinate multiple household members across different activities
and interact with life-cycle savings, it is important to know whether non-separability of preferences
makes it easier or harder to provide insurance without distorting incentives. The present analysis
answers this question by showing that the tradeoff shifts towards positive savings taxes, lower but
more persistent labor taxes, and more redistribution, when needs-based and ability-based redis-
tribution motives are aligned (low types have low ability and high needs), but towards savings
subsidies, higher but less persistent labor taxes, and less redistribution in the opposite case (low
ability types also have low consumption needs). Understanding how different redistribution moti-
ves interact thus becomes crucially important for any quantitative assessment of dynamic tax and
insurance policies.
Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 develops the core idea of incentive-adjusted proba-
bilities. Section 4 reviews the benchmark results with separable preferences. Section 5 discusses
optimal savings distortions, section 6 optimal labor wedges. Section 7 concludes with examples.
2 The Model
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is then revealed to the agent at the beginning of period t; in period t,





βt−1U (Ct, Yt; θt)
}
i.e. an agent’s utility in period t is a function of his current type θt, current consumption Ct and
current earnings Yt. The function U is twice continuously differentiable, UC > 0, UCC < 0, UY < 0,
UY Y < 0, Uθ > 0 and U otherwise satisfies the usual Inada conditions as C or Y approach 0 or
∞. Consumption and earnings are assumed to be observable but individual types are the agents’
private information. Types are private information, but the social planner keeps a record of the
agents’ past announcements and can borrow or save with a return R > 0.
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, with useful polar cases ρ = 0 (types are independent across
time, no persistence) and ρ = 1 (types follow a random walk, full persistence).
I make a few additional assumptions about U (C, Y ; θ). The first is the Strict Single-Crossing






This assumption guarantees monotonicity of any incentive-compatible allocation in the static
Mirrlees screening problem: on the margin, higher types are more willing to work.
























are both non-negative for all (C, Y ; θ). These two elasticities will play a key role in my analysis.
Finally, I make assumptions about the planner’s motives for redistribution. The signs of UCθ and
UY θ play a key role in determining how non-separabilities affect the optimal tax design problem. For
illustrative purposes, I will occasionally use the following class of “ weakly separable” preferences:
U (C, Y ; θ) = U (γ (C,C (θ))− n (Y, θ))
The utility aggregator U (·) is strictly increasing and concave. The function n (Y, θ) can be
interpreted as (a disutility of) hours worked to generate earnings Y .7 I assume that nY > 0,
nθ < 0, and nθY < 0, so that θ can be interpreted as the agent’s labor productivity or disutility
of effort, with higher types being more productive. This formulation captures redistribution of
effort from less to more productive agents, or equivalently, redistribution of leisure towards less
productive agents, i.e. redistribution “from each according to his ability”.
7While it is convenient for the analysis to define preferences in terms of the observables C and Y , it is straight-
forward to map the type-contingent preference over earnings into a preference over leisure or hours worked. I will
thus refer interchangeably to redistribution of Y as redistribution of earnings or leisure.
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The function γ (C,C (θ)) can be interpreted as a consumption index that includes a type-
dependent subsistence consumption C (θ). I assume that γC > 0, γC ≤ 0, and γCC ≥ 0. An increase
in subsistence consumption C (θ) then lowers the agent’s utility and increases their marginal utility.
This formulation thus introduces redistribution of consumption towards those with the highest
marginal utilities, i.e. redistribution “to each according to his needs”.



























If preferences are separable between consumption and earnings (U ′′ = 0), UY θ/UY captures
the motive for redistribution based on ability, and UCθ/UC the needs-based redistribution motive.
With the ordering assumption that higher types are more productive, it follows that UY θ/UY < 0.
The slope of C (·) in turn determines how consumption needs are aligned with ability. If
consumption needs are decreasing in type, then the two redistribution motives reinforce each other
towards increasing consumption and lowering effort of the lowest types, but they generate opposite
incentives effects: higher ability types have less consumption needs which reduces incentives to work.
In this case UCθ/UC ≤ 0. The Single-Crossing Condition imposes that 0 ≥ UCθ/UC > UY θ/UY ,
i.e. that ability has a stronger impact on work incentives than needs.
If consumption needs are instead increasing in type, UCθ/UC > 0. In this case, the Single-
Crossing Condition holds automatically since needs- and ability-based incentives are both stronger
for higher types. In this case, the planner has a motive of demanding higher effort from, and
offering higher consumption to high types.
Non-separability in preferences between consumption and earnings (U ′′ < 0) does not af-






> 0, i.e. higher types obtain higher utility from any pair (C, Y ).
Throughout the paper I assume that UY θ/UY < 0, and I distinguish between the case where
need-based redistribution is aligned with redistribution based on ability (0 ≥ UCθ/UC > UY θ/UY
for all (C, Y ; θ)) and the case where it is not (UCθ/UC ≥ 0 > UY θ/UY for all (C, Y ; θ)).8 In both
cases I assume that UCθ doesn’t change sign, i.e. either UCθ ≥ 0 for all (C, Y ; θ), or UCθ ≤ 0
for all (C, Y ; θ). The standard model of ability-based redistribution (U (C, Y ; θ) = U (C,N) with
N = Y/a (θ) and UCN ≥ 0, where a (θ) denotes labor productivity) belong to the first case.
8It is straight-forward to extend the results to the alternative case in which need-based redistribution is the
dominant channel for incentives, adapting the corresponding preference assumptions and their interpretation.
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2.1 Social planner’s problem










to maximize the agents’ expected utility,
subject to incentive compatibility and break-even conditions. I reformulate this problem as a
problem of minimizing the cost of the planner’s allocation, subject to promise-keeping and incentive
compatibility:
















































































]T → [θ, θ]T that are measurable
w.r.t. θt in period t.































I relax incentive compatibility to local IC by which this inequality must only hold for θ
′
sufficiently
close to θ. Following Pavan, Segal and Toikka (2014), Farhi and Werning (2013) or Kapicka (2013),
























































constitutes a promise or commitment towards future redistribution so as to








t−1) = 0, so the local IC condition reduces to its static counterpart. In
8
that case, incentive provision occurs only within, but not across periods, so the planner incurs no
dynamic incentive commitments and ∆ can be dropped from the set of state variables.9








as state variables, the optimal allocation then




subject to promise keeping



































































































K (v0) = K1
(
v0,∆0, θ
−1) = 0, i.e. ∆0 is set to minimize K1 (v0,∆, θ−1), meaning that at date 0
the planner’s break-even constraint is satisfied and the planner is free of prior commitments.

















as control variables and a dynamic programming problem























































































































































and the current type θt, to ease notation. These first order conditions define a
9As a corollary, it follows that unless types are time-independent, the planner’s solution is generically time-
inconsistent, since the planner must keep track of prior incentive commitments that are summarized by ∆: at date t
agents’ incentives are influenced by how the planner promises to reallocate resources at future dates. But once those
future dates arrive those prior incentive effects are “sunk”.
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, which consists of two com-
















) represents a direct
shadow cost of increasing type θ utility through higher consumption or lower earnings. The second










and added to the former.





























These conditions link the marginal costs of promised utility λt+1 and incentive commitments ηt+1
back in time to marginal costs of promised utility and shadow price of redistribution at θt. The
initial incentive commitment ∆0 is freely chosen, which results in η1 = −∂K1∂∆0 = 0.









































= 0, which imply that there are no distortions at













denote the labor wedge at θt, i.e. the distortion between the
marginal product and the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and earnings. Com-




























This static optimality condition succinctly summarizes the static trade-off between efficiency
and redistribution at date 1. To substantiate this interpretation, consider a perturbation that leaves

















































. The LHS in
the static optimality condition thus represents the planner’s resource gain from this perturbation
discounted by R−1, or in other words, the marginal efficiency cost of distorting labor supply at θt.
The RHS describes how this resource gain can be re-distributed. The perturbation changes the




































> 0. Therefore, upon reducing the distortion at θt, the
planner cannot freely re-distribute the extra resources across all types, but must raise the utility of




, relative to all types θ′ < θt. Hence, at each θ
t, the planner
faces a simple tradeoff between an efficiency motive on the LHS and a redistribution motive on the
RHS: More redistribution around θt must come at the cost of lower efficiency at θt, and vice versa.






























shadow price of redistribution, to a static marginal cost of redistribution at θ that is given by the
ratio of the resource loss of marginally increasing the tax distortion, to the reduction in marginal
information rents and hence the increase in redistribution that this entails.
3 Incentive-adjusted Probability Measures





λt can be defined by means of a change in the probability measure that governs the Markov chain
of types. This change captures the notion that incentive compatibility imposes restrictions on
the planner’s ability to redistribute utility from higher to lower types. Specifically, by combining




with the first order conditions for consumption and earnings and the









and λt, once based on
UθC(θt)
UC(θt)




and marginal disutilities of earnings. These characterizations are summarized below in
Proposition 1:
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and λt can be represented in one of the following two
(equivalent) forms:
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In this proposition Ê (·) denotes the expectations operator associated with cdf F̂ (·) and Ẽ (·)
the expectations operator associated with cdf F̃ (·). The main message from Proposition 1 is that
non-separabity of preferences enters the characterization of multipliers by adjusting the probability
measure over types from F (·) to F̂ (·) when UθC 6= 0 or from F (·) to F̃ (·) when UθY 6= 0.
The direction of these incentive adjustments depends on the signs of UθC and UθY . Since































when UθC < 0. The characterization









, i.e. incentive-adjusted and original probability measures coincide.
The ranking of these distributions in terms of first-order dominance is naturally linked to the
interpretation of UθC/UC and UθY /UY as needs- and ability-based redistribution motives. Since
UθY /UY < 0, increasing utilities by reducing earnings lowers information rents, and thus allows














is shifted towards higher (lower) types, whenever higher types have higher
(lower) consumption needs. When higher types have lower consumption needs (UθC < 0), increa-
sing consumption reduces information rents and thus allows for more redistribution towards lower
types. In contrast, when consumption needs are increasing in type, extra consumption increases in-










Redistributive Perturbations: These changes in probability measures are naturally linked




as the resource gain
of a local utility transfer from θ′ > θt to θ





ηt = 0, the optimal allocation reduces to a simple comparison of static costs




ηt > 0, the static marginal benefit is augmented by a
backward-looking dynamic component.
Consider the following class of perturbations which transfer consumption from all agents with

















> 0 if θ′ < θt




for all agents with types θ′ > θ and

















= ζ̂+ < 0, with ζ̂− − ζ̂+ = δ > 0, i.e. the
change in utility around θ is of size δ.
10See Brendon (2013) and Farhi and Werning (2012) for related perturbation arguments in static and dynamic
Mirrlees models with separable preferences.
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ζ̂− > 0 if θ
′ < θt















and this adjustment to the slope must be offered to all θ′′ > θ′ to restore local incentive compatibility
at θ′. But these modifications for any θ′′ > θ′ then generate further adjustments for all θ′′′ > θ′′,
and so on. By re-weighting the utility perturbations according to m̂ (·), the perturbation preserves
local incentive compatibility for all types: the ODE is solved by “integrating up” the cumulative
utility changes for higher types that are required as a result of preserving local IC at all lower types.









































. The discounted resource gain of














































as the marginal benefit of redistribution around θt
via consumption, i.e. the marginal benefit of transfering consumption around θt while maintai-
ning incentive compatibility and keeping expected utility unchanged. This transfer saves resources
because higher types have lower marginal utilities.
In the benchmark with separable preferences (UθC (·) = 0), this perturbation transfers utility
uniformly from all types θ
′
> θt to all type θ
′
< θt. With separable preferences, this uniform
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transfer of utilities does not affect local incentive compatibility constraints other than at θt, which
explains why the original and incentive-adjusted probability measures coincide.
An analogous perturbation argument explains why a local IC and expected-utility preserving
perturbation that redistributes leisure or earnings around θ must reweight states according to m̃ (·),




as the marginal benefit of redistribution via earnings.
Tying incentive adjustments to observables: The next proposition decomposes the chan-

















that represents the adjus-
tment to the marginal redistribution of resources: preserving incentive compatibility requires that
on the margin consumption must be redistributed in proportion to M̂ (·) and earnings in proportion
to M̃ (·). Furthermore, the latter only depends on the elasticities EC and EY and the distribution
of consumption and earnings.
Proposition 2 The incentive adjustments m̂ (·) and m̃ (·) admit the following representations:











































The incentive component M̂ (·) is increasing in θt so consumption must be redistributed re-
gressively on the margin except when EC = 0. Moreover, M̂ (·) only depends on the distribution












is decreasing in θt, unless EY = 0, so the marginal incentive-compatible
redistribution of utility via earnings is progressive. It only depends on the distribution of earnings
















were defined in section 2. They determine how much the
marginal rate of substitution responds to increases in consumption or earnings. These two parame-
ters have natural counter-parts in terms of income and substitution effects of labor supply, which










governs the relative strength of income and substitution effects.
When preferences are weakly separable (U (C, Y ; θ) = U (γ (C,C (θ))− n (Y, θ))), the risk and












































































decompose into a risk component from
the curvature in U and an incentive component from the non-separabilities between the consumption
utility γ (C,C (·)) or effort n (Y, ·) and type θ. When preferences are additively separable, then
U ′ (·) = χ (·) = 1, and the risk and incentive components in the adjusted probability measure just








. Also, with weakly separable preferences, the elasticity EC (·)
only depends on the curvature of γC (·), while the elasticity EY (·) only depends on the curvature
in n (Y, θ), in which case 1/EY (·) represents the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
4 Benchmark: separable preferences
Before developing the general characterization of optimal labor and savings wedges, it will be
useful to pause and review the well-known benchmark with separable preferences that has been
extensively analyzed in Golosov, Kocherlakota and Tsyvinski (2003), Farhi and Werning (2013),
Golosov, Troshkin and Tsyvinski (2016) and summarized by Stantcheva (2020). This can be done
simply by setting UθC = UCY = 0 in the characterization of multipliers given by Proposition 1.
Inverse Euler Equation: With separable preferences, the optimal savings wedge is given by






















The incentive-compatibility and expected utility preserving perturbation in the previous section
generalizes a well-known perturbation argument which explains why, with separable preferences, the




and therefore the discounted







. This expression arises
because the planner must redistribute resources at date t+ 1 in such a manner that utility changes
are uniform across all types, so as to preserve incentive compatibility. As a result the resources from
savings are distributed regressively: higher θt+1 types enjoy higher returns from savings than lower
θt+1 types. This observation then leads to the Inverse Euler Equation (IEE) for optimal savings
distortions, which augments the standard inter-temporal substitution channel by the wealth effect
of savings on future incentives and redistribution. This effect reduces the social returns to savings
relative to the private ones and is captured by the savings wedge implied by the IEE.
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i.e. the planner’s solution equates the static marginal cost of redistribution for each θt, to the













, which captures the marginal impact of prior incentive
commitments on the shadow price of redistribution in the current period. These prior incentive
commitments constitute a promise to limit future information rents. They appear in the recursive












> 0 denotes the rate
























describes the rate at which marginal information rents at θt feed back into









= 0 for all θt|θt−1, ∆ = 0 and the recursive optimality condition reduces to its





= 1 and information rents at θt are fully passed through to incentive
commitments at θt−1.
The optimal labor distortion trades off the marginal cost of efficiency distortions at θt against











increases distortions at θt, but leaves a type θt agent’s utility unchanged. The marginal efficiency









·δ. In addition, the same reduction in marginal information rents at θt also feeds back into




. This reduction in marginal information rents




, which must in turn be
adjusted to period t by the return R. Hence the dynamic benefit from additional redistribution at t















The recursive optimality condition thus smoothes tax distortions optimally between θt−1 and
θt, where backloading distortions to θt generates additional marginal benefits from redistribution





























i.e. at the optimum the current tax distortion is equal to a weighted sum of current and past
marginal benefits of redistribution, with weights that take into account the impact of efficiency dis-
tortions at θt on prior information rents. Hence, the optimal cost-benefit trade-off in the dynamic
model sets the cost of current tax distortions against the benefits of higher current and past redis-
tribution: more redistribution in period t reduces prior information rents and thus allows for more
redistribution in earlier periods without adversely affecting incentives. The incentive commitment
thus constitutes a commitment to future taxes and redistribution to limit current information rents.
Alternative representations: The recursive optimality condition can be related in a straight-
forward manner to the characterizations provided by Golosov, Troshkin and Tsyvinski (2016) and




























) UY θ (θt) /UY (θt)














, and therefore decreases with the current type realization.
One obtains the characterization provided by Farhi and Werning (2013) by multiplying both
sides of the recursive optimality condition by
UY θ(θt)

















































UY θ (θt−1) /UY (θt−1)
.
Hence the recursive optimality condition takes expectations of future tax distortions and future
marginal benefits of redistribution under an incentive-adjusted probability measure that re-weights
11Their representation is more general in that marginal costs and benefits can be multiplied with arbitrary weighting
functions before taking expectations. Hence their result also implies the present one by applying a weighting function





















trades off between the two in a such a way that a marginal transfer of tax distortions over time
does not change current information rents and redistribution.
With isoelastic preferences (U (C, Y ; θ) = γ (C)−κ (Y/A (θ))1+EY ) and A (θ) = eφθ with φ > 0,
the expected marginal benefit of future redistribution is (1 + EY )Cov
(










= E(%t(θt)|θt−1) that only depends on the sto-
chastic process of types.
Trading off efficiency and redistribution in this manner relies on the fact that an intervention at
or around θ only affects incentives locally when preferences are separable. This assumption com-
pletely separates the incentive-compatible utility transfers across time from efficient redistribution
within each period. Moreover, the characterization of optimal allocations remains incomplete since









each type. In the remainder of this paper I show how these two results generalize to non-separable
preferences, and I complete the characterization of optimal allocations by also considering the
benefits of redistribution via earnings or leisure.
5 Optimal Savings Wedges
I now discuss the implications of Proposition 1 for optimal savings wedges. Two changes appear in
the expression for λt, relative to the separable benchmark: the use of incentive-adjusted probabili-



















The use of incentive-adjusted probabilities follows from the fact that marginal returns to savings
must be redistributed in proportion to M̂ (·) for consumption and M̃ (·) for earnings, in order to
preserve local incentive compatibility.
The additional term in the expression for λt identifies a novel feedback effect from savings to
current marginal information rents. A marginal increase in savings at θt−1, which is redistributed at












to preserve incentive compatibility, changes












· δ, and as discussed














measures the feedback from future returns to savings into current
information rents, and these information rents are “priced” by ηt, which represents the shadow cost
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feedback from a labor deferral to current information rents.
Combining the dynamic optimality conditions with the characterization for λt+1 and rearranging






















































on the RHS describe the inter-temporal tradeoff between
saving resources at θt and redistributing the returns to savings in an incentive-compatible manner
at date t + 1. As before savings reduce future redistribution. The incentive-adjusted expectation
amplifies the impact of savings on future incentives when UθC > 0 and dampens it when UθC < 0.
The two new terms that appear in this expression are related to how savings affect information
rents and redistribution at θt. Savings affect current redistribution through (i) the direct effect of
savings on redistribution at θt, and (ii) the feedback from future information rents at θt+1|θt to
redistribution at θt. These two effects determine together how savings affect current redistribution,
which in turn increases or reduces the resources generated by savings at θt. They are both weighted



































< 0) associated with this change in redistribution








term on the LHS.
However, this direct effect must be offset against the feedback of savings from future to current









on the RHS. This term inher-
its the sign of UθC (·), i.e. the effect nets out when preferences are separable, it reduces current
redistribution when consumption needs are increasing in type (UθC (·) > 0) and increases current re-
distribution when consumption needs are decreasing in type (UθC (·) < 0). This force works against





Theorem 1 shows how these effects combine to determine the overall savings wedge.
Theorem 1 : An interior solution to the multi-period dynamic optimal taxation problem satisfies
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UθC (θt) /UC (θt)− UθY (θt) /UY (θt)
.











































Theorem 1 highlights the existence of a new intertemporal tradeoff between redistribution at
date t and redistribution at date t + 1. The dynamic Mirrlees problem augments the standard
consumption-savings tradeoff in resources by an additional inter-temporal tradeoff between present
and future redistribution that is internalized by the planner, but not by private savings decisions.
This tradeoff in turn can lead to optimal savings taxes or subsidies, depending on whether the
planner is more concerned about present or future redistribution, as well as by the direction in
which savings taxes or subsidies facilitate redistribution.













redistributes future marginal returns regressively to preserve incentive compatibility at θt+1. This
second factor is derived from the IC-preserving change in probability measure and averages to 1. It
therefore doesn’t affect the average savings subsidy, generalizing the result of zero expected wealth
taxes from Kocherlakota (2005) to arbitrary non-separable preferences. The first factor internalizes
the effect of savings on current redistribution. This factor determines whether savings should, on
average, be taxed or subsidized.
Effect of savings on current redistribution: If types are not too persistent (the direct effect
dominates), savings should be subsidized if consumption needs are increasing in type (UθC > 0) and
taxed if consumption needs are decreasing in type (UθC < 0). These prescriptions are reversed if
the indirect effect dominates. The magnitude of the wedge is decreasing in the degree of persistence




R 0 say that savings should be subsidized








, is larger than the
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. This condition can




























governs the relative strength of the indirect effect. If types are highly persistent, one reverts to
a “benchmark” in which it is optimal to leave savings decisions on average undistorted. In this
case the direct and indirect effect on current redistribution just offset so savings have no impact
on current information rents and redistribution. But this knife-edge result arises for reasons very
different from Kocherlakota (2005), since it is based on two competing forces for savings taxes or
subsidies just canceling each other.
Effect of savings on future incentives: The change of probability measure
M̂(θt+1)
E(M̂(θt+1)|θt)
summarizes how returns to savings must be distributed to preserve incentive compatibility. Since
M̂ (·) is increasing in θt+1 unless EC = 0, the returns on savings are regressive, i.e. higher


















, i.e. the state-contingent savings subsidy redu-
ces incentives to save by increasing returns for high realizations of θt+1.








, and the representation collapses to
the standard IEE. In general, the adjustment to preserve incentive compatibity can be either more









equivalently whether UθC > 0 or UθC < 0.
Finally, if EC = 0, the generalized IEE coincides with the normal Euler Equation and it is
optimal not to distort savings. This case corresponds to a generalized form of GHH preferences.
With weakly separable preferences (U (C, Y ; θ) = U (γ (C,C (θ))− n (Y, θ))), the inverse Euler
































This representation illustrates that the marginal returns to savings, after adjusting for incentive
compatibility, depend on three elements: (i) the arithmetic expectation of the “outer” marginal
utility U ′ (·) which does not affect incentives, (ii) the harmonic expectation of the “inner” marginal
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utility γC (·) which does, and (iii) an incentive adjustment to the expectations given by χ (·) which
factors in the non-separability in γ. It is thus important to distinguish between non-separability
coming from curvature in the aggregator function U (·) which is immaterial for incentives and thus
treated according to the standard Euler Equation, and curvature and non-separability in the inner
function γ, which matters for incentives and is thus treated according to the Inverse Euler Equation,
with an incentive adjustment for the non-separability in γ. The result is a “mixed” Euler Equation
that combines elements of both the standard and the Inverse Euler Equation in one.
Optimal Social Mobility: Theorem 1 has direct implications for the question of optimal
social mobility, originally posed in the work of Thomas and Worrall (1990) and Atkeson and Lucas
(1992) who presented dynamic private information economies in which marginal utilities tended to
infinity and consumption to 0 with probability 1 for almost all agents. To this end, I set βR = 1, so
that long-run dynamics are not determined by discounting and returns. Then the optimal savings
wedge implies the following about the process of Marginal utilities:




































The first part of the corollary states that if it is optimal to always restrict savings, the in-
verse marginal utility process (and by extension, consumption) follow a super-martingale under
the incentive-adjusted probability measure, and marginal utility follows a sub-martingal under the
original measure. This in turn generalizes the force towards immiseration that is present when
preferences are separable and inverse Marginal utilities follow a Martingale.
When it is instead optimal to subsidize savings, then the inequalities are reversed and inverse
marginal utilities and consumption drift up under the incentive-adjusted probability measure.
While this cannot be directly mapped into corresponding dynamics under the original measure,







 ≥ E(U ′ (θt+1) · χ (θt+1)
U ′ (θt) · χ (θt)
|θt
)
and when χ (·) is increasing in θt+1 and types are sufficiently mean-reverting, then it is optimal to









, thus breaking the forces towards immiseration. As discussed for example by Farhi and
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Werning (2007), the existing immiseration results rely on the fact that at the optimal allocation,
temporary shocks to labor productivity have permanent effects on future marginal utilities as a
consequence of smoothing incentives over time. Here the temporary co-movement of consumption
needs or marginal utilities with types makes it optimal to build some “foregiveness” into optimal
consumption allocations: more productive types also have higher consumption needs, which makes
it optimal to front-load consumption increases for incentive reasons. This restores mean reversion
in the long-run without differential discounting or altruism towards future generations as in Farhi
and Werning (2007) or Phelan (2006).
Inter-temporal Earnings Wedge: Along the same lines, one can re-cast optimal inter-
temporal allocations of effort or labor by a generalized IEE which yields the following expression:
−UY (θt) = βR
(
























UθC(θt)/UC(θt)− UθY (θt)/UY (θt)
.
The generalized IEE for earnings augments the tradeoff in intertemporal allocation of earnings
by a tradeoff between current and future redistribution that is internalized by the planner but not
by private decisions. This second tradeoff decomposes into the effect on future incentives through
the incentive-adjusted probability or returns M̃(θt+1), a direct effect on current redistribution, and
the feedback from future to current redistribution. The latter two are captured by s̃Y (θ
t).
Since redistribution based on ability lowers current information rents (UθY /UY < 0), M̃ (·) is


















, so the incentive adjustment favors backloading leisure, unless n (Y, θ) is linear
in Y , or EY = 0. On the other hand, if the direct effect dominates the indirect, then s̃Y (θt) < 0
which implies that it is optimal to backload earnings, and subsidize current leisure. Since the latter
dominates on average, earnings become mean-reverting at the optimal allocation.
12Under the weak separability assumption, −UY (·) is decreasing in θ2 whenever nY (·) is decreasing in θ2. This
holds automatically whenever Y (·) is not too strongly increasing.
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6 Optimal Labor Wedges
I now turn to the caracterization of optimal labor wedges. Combining Proposition 1 with the





























The equation combines the recursive characterization of labor wedges from the case with separable
preferences with the observation that the optimal allocation equates the marginal cost of efficiency
distortions to the marginal benefit of redistribution through either consumption or earnings - and
the two marginal benefits of redistribution must therefore also be equal to each other. In other
words, the planner equates marginal costs and benefits of redistribution, and is indifferent between
redistribution via consumption or via earnings at each realization of θ. The marginal benefits
of redistribution include both a static and a dynamic component, which are based on the same
arbitrage between smoothing tax distortions and backloading to internalize the future marginal
benefit of redistribution as in the separable model.

















. The rate of decay of
information rents need not be the same for redistribution via consumption or via leisure. Hence









, then the optimal allocation will generate more redistribution via consumption












has more persistent effects on















































Hence, how the non-separability affects the rate of decay of information rents is key to understanding
the persistence of labor wedges and the respective impact of marginal benefits of redistribution via
consumption and earnings.


























to information rents at θt−1.
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Consider the same perturbation as in section 3, which marginally increases distortions and redis-
tribution at θt while preserving expected utility and incentive compatibility. As before this pertur-












feeds into marginal in-








also feeds back into information








to preserve incentive compatibility and expected utility, then marginal information rents for θ′ 6= θt












, and these changes in turn feed













to information rents at θt−1. Along the same lines,








to information rents at θt−1.








in Proposition 1 leads to the following comparative
statics result:


































































= 0 for all θ and UθC/UC
and UθY /UY are constant.








differs from the decay















from consumption or earnings changes at θt to marginal information rents at θt−1. If this feedback




to information rents at θt−1 is positive and
results in an optimal persistence of labor taxes that is higher than the decay of information rents. If
instead the feedback from consumption or earnings changes to prior information rents is decreasing




to information rents at θt−1 is negative
and the optimal persistence of labor taxes that is less than the decay of information rents.
Two special cases deserve to be mentioned: first, at the top and the bottom of the distribution
the optimal persistence of labor taxes converges to the decay of information rents since marginal
benefits of redistribution vanish at the top and bottom of the distribution. Second, if the decay






= 0 for all θ), and UθC/UC and UθY /UY are constant, then
the feedback is constant for all types, and therefore the optimal persistence of labor taxes is also
uniform and equal to the decay of information rents. In these cases, future redistribution has
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, i.e. the planner’ solution equalizes static marginal
benefits of redistribution and the persistence of labor tax distortions only depends on the exogenous
decay of information rents.
































































When the two marginal benefits have equal persistence, the optimal labor wedge satisfies the
following simple characterization:






































































Theorem 2 shows that with equal persistence, the optimal labor wedge corresponds to the ratio
of the marginal benefit of redistribution through earnings to the marginal benefit of redistribution
through consumption. This condition captures the basic intuition that the planner arbitrages
between asking the high income types to work more vs. asking them to consume less, and on
the margin the planner’s solution must be indifferent between the two. When persistence is not
equal, then the ratio of the two marginal benefits serves as an upper or lower bound, given that
the planner’s solution trades off more static redistribution against higher persistence.




= 0). In this case the optimal
labor wedge only depends on static costs and benefits of redistribution, and the two static optimality



















































The first optimality condition restates and generalizes the well-known ABC formula of Diamond
(1998) and Saez (2001) to the present model which allows for redistribution based on both needs
and abilities. The second optimality condition complements the first by obtaining the equivalent
representation from marginal benefits of redistribution via earnings. The two optimality conditions
offer a new interpretation to this representation as equating the marginal efficiency cost of redistri-
































correspond to the re-scaled marginal benefits of redistribution via consump-
tion or earnings.
By taking the ratio between the two marginal benefit terms I obtain the alternative represen-
tation given by Theorem 2, which allows me to unify the representation of optimal labor wedges in
the static and dynamic Mirrlees model.
What’s more, recall that in the iso-elastic case M̂ (·) and M̃ (·) directly derive from the distribu-








are robustly tied to observable statistics
and estimates of the elasticities EC (·) and EY (·) which relate to income and substitution effects
of labor supply. In Hellwig and Werquin (2021), we tie this alternative representation of optimal
income taxes to the sufficient statistics approach of Saez (2001).
The above representation also determines how optimal taxes and marginal costs and benefits


















p were defined in the text fol-






consumption needs more regressive or less progressive. An increase in −p
′(·)
p(·) makes productivities
or disutilities of effort more sensitive to type, which makes UY θUY more negative. An increase in
−U ′′
U ′




magnitude. I also consider comparative statics w.r.t. EC (·) and EY (·) which only enter through
their respective marginal benefits.
Proposition 4 For a given allocation of consumption C (·) or earnings Y (·):




p(·) , and independent of
EC (·), EY (·), and −U
′′
U ′ .
(ii) The (rescaled) marginal benefit of redistribution via consumption B̂ (·) is increasing in EC (·)
and −U
′′
U ′ , decreasing in
χ′(·)
χ(·) , and independent of EY (·) and
−p′(·)
p(·) .
(iii) The (rescaled) marginal benefit of redistribution via earnings B̃ (·) is increasing in −U ′′U ′ and
−p′(·)




Proposition 4 shows how non-separabilities in preferences alter the tradeoff between efficiency
and redistribution. It translates the stochastic dominance ordering of F̂ (·), F (·) and F̃ (·), as well
as the elasticities EC (·) and EY (·) into comparative statics of re-scaled marginal costs and benefits
of redistribution for a given type-contingent consumption or earnings profile. These comparative
statics then identify welfare-improving changes to the optimal allocation that can be implemented
through a combination of the perturbations that were presented above:
If EC (·) increases, the marginal benefits of redistributing consumption increase, and the op-
timal allocation therefore shifts towards higher labor taxes, more redistribution via consumption
and less redistribution via earnings. If EY (·) increases, the marginal benefits of redistributing ear-
nings are reduced, so the optimal allocation shifts towards less redistribution of earnings and more
redistribution of consumption, while also opting for labor taxes.13
If χ′ (·) /χ (·) increases, it is optimal to increase redistribution via earnings and compensate
with a combination of higher labor taxes and/or less redistribution via consumption, in line with
the intuition that an increase in χ′ (·) /χ (·) results in a less progressive or more regressive motive
of redistribution based on consumption needs.
If −p′ (·) /p (·) increases, productivities or disutilities of effort are more dispersed so the gains
from redistribution via earnings increase. It’s then optimal to increase labor taxes and redistribution
via earnings. Redistribution via consumption may increase or decrease depending on whether the
combined effect of the tax increase and the increase in a′ (·) /a (·) results in higher or lower marginal
costs of efficiency distortions.
If−U ′′/U ′ increases, additional curvature in utility strengthens both redistribution motives. The
planner gains from increasing labor taxes and redistribution via both consumption and earnings.
To recap, increases in EC (·), −U ′′/U ′ and −p′ (·) /p (·) or a reduction in EY (·) unambiguously
shift the tradeoff between efficiency and redistribution towards higher taxes and more redistribution,
but the effect of χ′ (·) /χ (·), which captures changes in the motive for redistribution based on
consumption needs, is more subtle: An increase in χ′ (·) /χ (·) reduces both the marginal benefits of
redistribution based on consumption and the marginal cost of efficiency distortions. This leads to
more redistribution via earnings, but whether this is compensated by a reduction of redistribution
via consumption or an increase in taxes, or a combination of both, is ambiguous and depends on the
relative effect of χ′ (·) /χ (·) on the marginal cost of efficiency distortions and the marginal benefit
of consumption-based redistribution.
13This comparative static of the labor supply elasticity EY (·) holds −p
′(·)
p(·) constant. In practice, an increase in the




Optimal Persistence of Labor wedges: My final result links optimal tax-smoothing to
the sign and magnitude of the savings wedge, which completes the connection between the two
wedges. Theorem 3 generalizes the tax-smoothing representation of Farhi and Werning (2013) to
non-separable preferences and provides an analogous representation based on redistribution through
earnings.14
Theorem 3 : The optimal labor wedge satisfies the following two recursive characterizations:




































































) 1/ (−UY (θt))




















































This representation incorporates two changes relative to the benchmark with separable prefe-
rences. First, expected future tax distortions and marginal benefits of redistribution are computed




































, which re-weights the distortions according to the incentive-adjusted
returns M̂(θt) or M̃(θt). The expected marginal benefits of redistribution can be re-stated along
similar lines.
Second the persistence of the labor wedge is determined not just by the tradeoff between fu-








, but also by the
14The dynamic tax formula of Golosov, Troshkin and Tsyvinski (2016) follows from the recursive optimality con-
dition along the same lines as in the separable case.
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optimal savings wedge 1 + ŝC(θ




. The savings wedge enters optimal tax-
















private return on savings is given by R. The planner’s solution internalizes dynamic tradeoffs bet-
ween redistribution at θt and θt−1 that are not internalized by private savings decisions. The same
wedge enters the resource tradeoff between current and future tax distortions. The savings wedge
can thus either reinforce or dampen labor-tax smoothing: a savings tax increases the persistence
of labor taxes, while a savings subsidy reduces it. Which one arises is determined as before by the
net impact of savings on current information rents.








smooth labor wedges inter-temporally in such a
way that a marginal transfer of distortions leaves current information rents unchanged. As shown
in proposition 3 labor wedges become more (less) persistent when feedback from future to current
information rents is increasing (decreasing) in θt.
















, the persistence of
labor taxes thus depends on the sign, level and slope of UθC/UC and UθY /UY , which govern the
strength and direction of the need-based and ability based redistribution motives.
7 Examples
In this section I present four examples to illustrate the different possibilities that the main results
allow for: (i) with GHH preferences, the wealth effect on incentives disappears, and the characte-
rization of savings and labor distortions are uniquely determined from static concerns about redis-
tribution. (ii) With preferences that incorporate type dependent marginal utilities or consumption
needs (subsistence consumption), the optimal savings tax or subsidy is linked to how consumption
needs vary with type. (iii) In an extension with type-dependent volatility, the persistence of labor
wedges becomes state-dependent.
1. GHH Preferences: Suppose that U (C, Y ; θ) = U
(
C − κ (Y/A (θ))1+EY
)
, A (θ) = eφθ
with φ > 0, and −U
′′(·)









, and M̂(θt) = 1, i.e. the wealth effect on incentives disappears and the adjustment















































































































































































As these expressions show, with GHH preferences the adjusted probability measure only in-
cludes a risk component
U ′(θt)
E(U ′(θt)|θt−1) , but the incentive component M̂(·) disappears. If types are
not too persistent, risk aversion introduces a motive for taxing savings and making labor taxes








independent of θt, the GHH preferences result in higher feedback of information rents and higher
optimal persistence of the labor wedge.15
2. Isoelastic preferences: Suppose preferences take the form







− κ (Y/A (θ))1+EY ,
with EC ≥ 1 and EY > 0.16 Suppose also that A (θ) = eφθ, φ > 0, and C (θ) = CeΓθ where Γ











−(1+EY ), M̂(θt) = C
(
θt
)EC , and M̃(θt) = Y (θt)−EY . The














































is decreasing in θt.








Ā (θ) = C (θ)
EC−1
1+EY A (θ). Hence the iso-elastic preference model has an equivalent reinterpretation as including a
shock to time preference rates.
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, and to tax them otherwise.





















= 1) or consumption needs independent of type (Γ = 0), the savings subsidy is 0 and
consumption growth is independent of the current type, resulting in divergence of consumption
profiles. These dynamics are reinforced when Γ < 0, which leads to a savings tax that frontloads
consumption and reduces future consumption growth. In addition consumption growth is increasing
in θt resulting in even more divergence and polarization of consumption over time.








< 1, then it is optimal to subsidize savings and con-
sumption needs introduce a force towards mean-reversion. The resulting consumption process is
mean-reverting around a positive growth trend. With Γ < 0 on the other hand, the savings tax
frontloads consumption and lowers average consumption growth. Furthermore, consumption gro-
wth is increasing in θt resulting in more divergence of consumption over time.
3. Subsistence consumption needs: Suppose preferences take the form
U (C, Y ; θ) =
1
1− χ
(C − C (θ))1−χ − κ (Y/A (θ))1+EY ,
with χ ≥ 0, A (θ) = eφθ, φ > 0, and C (θ) = CeΓθ where Γ denotes as before the sensitivity







































































































< 0 it is optimal to tax savings, in the
opposite case it is optimal to subsidize them.




is decreasing in θt. This holds
whenever Γ is negative or at most small and positive, i.e. consumption needs are decreasing or not
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, i.e. at the optimal allocation, marginal benefits
of redistribution through consumption are smaller, but more persistent than marginal benefits of
redistribution through earnings - the decreasing consumption needs strengthen the planner’s motive
to redistribute consumption towards lower types, along with a positive tax on savings. If instead





















the optimal allocation shifts towards more redistribution via earnings, and it becomes optimal to
subsidize savings.
As in the case with GHH preferences, the endogenous persistence and the savings wedge are




and positive savings taxes when Γ < 0. But the two
effects can also result in savings subsidies and less persistence than at the separable benchmark if
Γ > 0 (consumption needs are increasing in type).
4. Type-dependent volatility: Suppose as in example 2 that preferences are isoelastic,







− κ (Y/A (θ))1+EY ,
with EC ≥ 1, A (θ) = eφθ, φ > 0, and C (θ) = CeΓθ where Γ can be positive or negative. Suppose
that θt = µ (θt−1) + σ (θt−1) vt, where vt is iid over time, and µ










= µ′ (θt−1) + σ
′ (θt−1)






is increasing in θt if σ





is decreasing in θt if σ












































































depends on Γσ′ (θt−1). This example shows that
type dependent volatilities also contribute the persistence of the labor wedge: the feedback of infor-
mation rents is increasing with the uncertainty about the current type realization, which increases
persistence in labor wedges when Γ > 0 and σ′ (θt−1) > 0.
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8 Conclusion
This paper aims to provide a general analysis of optimal dynamic taxation with non-separable
preferences, and explore to what extent the core insights from the existing literature survive or
generalize. First, I have shown how to incorporate non-separability in the analysis by means of
a simple change in probability measures that captures the need for regressive redistribution of
resources, and/or either progressive or regressive redistribution of utilities, as a means to preserve
incentive compatibility. This incentive adjustment depends on preference parameters such as risk
aversion, labor supply elasticities and consumption needs.
Second, by applying this incentive adjustment to the optimality condition for redistribution
through both consumption and earnings, I obtain a double representation of the optimal labor and
savings wedges, which completes the existing representations that are solely based on redistribution
through consumption. This double representation captures the basic intuition that the planner can
transfer utility from high to low types by transfering either consumption or leisure, and at the
optimal allocation, the planner is indifferent between the two.
Third, I have shown how non-separability generates feedback from future allocations to current
information rents. This feedback generates a new inter-temporal tradeoff between current and
future redistribution and tax distortions which in turn modifies the main results from the existing
literature on optimal savings and labor tax distortions. Optimal savings taxes may be positive or
negative, depending on how savings internalize a tradeoff between current and future redistribution.
The dynamics of labor taxes inherit the same savings wedge that determines how the planner’s
solution discounts resources from one period to the next. Finally the optimal persistence of labor
taxes also depends on how tax-smoothing feeds back into current information rents.
One stark benchmark result stands out: when preferences are "sufficiently" isoelastic and types
are highly persistent then the rationale for savings taxes or subsidies again disappears, and labor
taxes are highly persistent with an upwards drift that is independent of assumptions about agent’s
preferences. Whether or not the theoretical results presented here also provide a strong quantitative
case for taxing or subsidizing savings then depends on whether this benchmark comes close to reality
or not. Answering this question, or related ones that bring the present results closer to applications,
is an important direction for future work.
Finally, my results do not address the issue of tax implementation. In Hellwig (2021), I propose
an implementation using history-dependent labor taxes with no private savings, and show that
private savings decisions do not matter for the implementation of the optimal (or more generally,
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any) incentive compatible allocation, but only serve to fulfill future tax obligations, extending the
principle of Ricardian Equivalence to dynamic Mirrlees models. Even when savings are allowed
the resulting labor and savings taxes need not match the wedges of the present characterization
one-for-one: with dynamic information rents, the static labor supply decision includes a forward-
looking element that alters the mapping from static labor wedges to tax implementations. Future
work will have to explore the importance of these dynamic information rents for optimal tax design.
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9 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1:

















































































































t−1) |θ′ ≥ θt, θt−1)− λt} .
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) UθC (θ, θt−1)
UC (θ, θt−1)





































to the inverse marginal utilities of earnings.
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Proof of Proposition 2:



































































) C ′ (θt)
C (θt)









































where K is a constant of proportionality that can be set equal to 1 as a normalization (given that
the change in probability measure is defined by m̂ (θ) /Ê (m̂ (θ)).
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Proof of Theorem 1:



















































 = (βR)−1 Ê( 1UC (θt+1) |θt
)
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Proof of Proposition 3:









Proof of Theorem 2:



















(1− τt (θt)) B̂ (θt)
.

















































Proof of Proposition 4:
(i) Notice that M̂B (·)UC (·) can be rewritten as
































′′)dlnC(θ′′), it follows that for a given allocation, M̂ (θ′) /M̂ (θ) is increasing in θ
and becomes steeper when EC (·) goes up, but does not change with EY (·). Therefore, holding fixed
F̂ (θ), M̂B (θ)UC (θ) is increasing with EC (·) and bounded below by RM̂B (θ)UC (θ) ≥ F̂ (θ)−F (θ)f(θ) .
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In addition, F̂ (θ) does not depend on EC (·) or EY (·), but an increase in χ′/χ or a reduction
in −U ′′/U ′ both increase UθC/UC , which is independent of a′/a. The results then follow by noting
that an increase in UθC/UC results in a FOSD shift in F̂ (·) which lowers M̂B (·).
(ii) Rewrite M̃B (·) (−UY (·)) as
































′′)dlnC(θ′′), it follows that for a given allocation M̃ (θ′) /M̃ (θ) is decreasing
in θ and becomes steeper when EY (·) goes up, but does not change with EC (·). Therefore, holding
fixed F̃ (θ), M̃B (·) (−UY (·)) is decreasing with EY (·) and bounded above by RM̃B (·) (−UY (·)) ≤
F̃ (θ)−F (θ)
f(θ) .
In addition, F̃ (θ) does not depend on EC (·) or EY (·), but an increase in a′/a or a reduction in
−U ′′/U ′ both increase UθY /UY , which is independent of χ′/χ. The results then follow by noting
that an increase in UθY /UY results in a FOSD shift in F̃ (·) which lowers M̃B (·).
(iii) Rewrite M̂B (·)UC (·) and M̃B (·) (−UY (·)) as
RM̂B (·)UC (·) =
τ(θ)
1−τ(θ)
UθC/UC − UθY /UY
=
RM̃B (θ) (−UY (θ))
1− τ (θ)
and which only depend on UθC/UC − UθY /UY = χ′/χ− a′/a.
Proof of Theorem 3:































, and take expectations with respect to the incentive-adjusted proba-

























































































































analogous representation based on redistribution through earnings.
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